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FOREWORD
It is the tradition in the United States as in other industrialized societies to
regard personal health care services as "different" from the vast majority of
other goods and services. This difference derives from public concern about
levels of private consumption by disadvantaged individuals and a widely held
view that consumers are not well-positioned to deal effectively in health care
markets, primarily because they lack the requisite knowledge. These beliefs
have been responsible for the various important institutional arrangements
that characterize health care-licensure of professionals and organizations,
professional ethics codes, the dominance of nonprofit organizations in several
parts of the health sector, public and private insurance, and the fee-for-service
system. The lack of consumer knowledge meant that consumer trust was
required. Such trust, it was argued, could not be maintained in a market in
which buyers and sellers dealt with each other at arm's length. If there was to
be no market in the usual sense, then there was no role for market-perfecting
policies, including antitrust scrutiny.
During the last decade and a half or so, there has been a major change in
thinking about the roles of market forces in health care and in markets for
professional services more generally, of the effectiveness of public regulation,
and of the appropriate role of government as an antitrust enforcer. The
changes have been reflected in legislative and judicial decisions as well as in
the policies of public regulatory agencies. The new interest in competition as
opposed to regulation in health care and other markets, such as airlines and
banking, the reduction in special privileges for the professions, and the more
limited role for government as an antitrust enforcer reflect both a new faith in
the market power of buyers and a realization that public intervention also
causes distortions. Sometimes the cure can be worse than the disease.
Although there is to our knowledge no estimate of the frequency of antitrust
suits by sector, the appearance of some continued antitrust activity in the
health care field probably has much to do with the fact that antitrust is new in
this field.
The growth in competitive forces in the health field is reflected in a
number of important changes-increased market share of capitated health
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plans with a corresponding decline in the fee-for-service sector, more
employment-based cafeteria benefits plans, growth of preferred provider
organizations, decline of entry regulation as embodied in certificate-of-need
programs, advertising by hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes, and improved
information on health care providers such has published mortality rates by
hospital.
Recognizing the trend toward competition in the health care field and the
changing role of antitrust enforcement as applied to health care and to other
sectors of the economy, we convened a meeting of experts in antitrust and in
health care for one day in Nashville in October 1986. Based on the meeting,
we prepared a report which we later used as the basis for writing letters of
invitation to participate in this symposium on antitrust issues in health care.
Most of the issues discussed at the one-day meeting have been addressed by
the authors of the papers in this volume. The authors added many others to
the list.
To set the stage for the papers in this volume, and because the experts at
the October 1986 meeting set a long-term agenda for research on antitrust
enforcement in the health care field, we review some of the key conclusions of
that meeting here. The topics that emerged from the meeting fall under these
general headings: hospital peer review; hospital mergers and management
contracts; managed health care plans; relationships among insurers and
providers; state of competition in health insurance markets; quality-of-care
issues; and technology assessment.
KEY ANTITRUST ISSUES

IN HEALTH CARE

Hospital Peer Review. There is an increased number of cases involving a
physician plaintiff against a hospital and members of its medical staff over the
denial, limitation, or revocation of hospital privileges. In principle, peer
review should allow a hospital's medical staff to safeguard quality by
disciplining and even "weeding out" its "bad apples." Physician plaintiffs
have argued that denial of privileges has been used as a mechanism for
eliminating a competitor. Hospital peer review involves'a number of issues.
Should peer review be viewed as an activity by competitors with the effect of
eliminating competition or an activity conducted by medical staff to safeguard
quality, which is presumably in the hospital's interest as a competitor in the
market for hospital services? Does the hospital board in reviewing the results
of the deliberations of the hospital medical staff act in the hospital's interest
or merely as a "rubber stamp" for the medical staff whose financial interest
may be served by excluding a physician member? What have been the
impacts of antitrust scrutiny of hospital peer review? What has been the cost
of such litigation? Have suits inhibited meaningful peer review? Or have they
made peer review fairer and less anticompetitive?
Hospital Mergers and Management Contracts. The hospital industry is being
transformed from a "cottage industry" into one with fewer, horizontally-
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integrated units. Although such consolidation may produce various
efficiencies, there may also be a lessening of competition.
A number of economic and legal questions are evident. What are
meaningful ways to define product and geographic markets in the hospital
industry? Unique features potentially affecting market definition are the
importance of insurance coverage for hospital care, the local nature of the
service being provided, and the role of physicians as agents for patients in
hospital markets. For various reasons, geographic markets appear to be
widening as health maintenance organizations and others purchase care on a
contract basis, sometimes at considerable distance from patients. Also,
hospitals are increasingly providing services that previously were delivered by
other organizations, such as home health care services and ambulatory
surgery. What are the implications of these trends for product market
definition? According to which mechanisms do hospitals compete? What is
the role of price versus nonprice competition? Of referral mechanisms? To
what extent do mergers result in economies-of-scale and of-scope? How do
management contracts which have become increasingly prevalent in the
hospital field during the last two decades fit into antitrust analysis? How
should antitrust enforcement agencies deal with the downsizing of the
industry that is currently occurring? For various reasons, hospital admissions
and length of stay have declined in recent years leading to excess hospital
capacity. How should the potential consequences of mergers of two or more
hospitals in financial distress be analyzed?
Managed Health Care Plans. A "managed health care plan" is a loose term
for a plan that seeks to achieve savings in health care costs by a combination
of price reductions and improved management of health care utilization. One
such organization is the preferred provider organization ("PPO").
Participants at our meeting noted that PPO's may be organized by physicians
in some localities to forestall growth of health maintenance organizations.
The following specific types of issues were identified by the experts. What
are the major types of managed health care plans and where are the major
potential points of antitrust concern? Since these plans often combine several
stages of production, such as hospital, ambulatory, and home health care,
there is possible concern about vertical restraints on competition. Since such
plans sometimes enroll a large percentage of physicians in a market, there is
also reason to worry about possible horizontal restraints on competition. At
what market share is there reason to worry? What are other indicators of
potential exercise of providers' ability to act in concert, including pricing
practices that may be considered to be "predatory"? The degree of
integration of these managed plans is important for antitrust purposes. When
joint pricing policies are established, should these policies be viewed as a
cooperative activity of independent firms or alternatively as price-setting by
an integrated firm?
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Relations between Insurers and Providers.
Physicians and other health
professionals have not been granted an antitrust exemption accorded labor
unions in pursuit of their collective self-interest. Thus, unlike unions, it is not
possible for groups of physicians, dentists, and others to bargain collectively
with private insurers. Under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,' medical and other
health care organizations are able to petition government agencies for
changes in reimbursement that are judged to serve the collective interest of
the petitioners.
The market power of some insurers, such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield in
some states, may be sufficient to permit monopsonistic exploitation of
individual sellers of health services. To the extent that monopsony supplants
competition, there will be less output (and hence some patients may not
receive beneficial care) and providers will earn lower incomes. Monopsony
must be analyzed from the standpoint that the market has other
noncompetitive elements. For example, under complete coverage, levels of
health use may be too high. Some output restraint from monopsonies may be
beneficial under certain circumstances.
Again there are numerous questions to be addressed: When an insurer
with a high market share purchases services from practitioners in atomistic
markets, what happens to price, output, and the qualitative aspects of services
provided? How in turn are premiums affected? Does (or should) advice by a
physician organization about fees such as coverage of a particular diagnostic
or therapeutic procedure have first amendment protection? Where does one
draw the line on threats by a practitioner organization that are made to elicit a
desired response from a payer? Should Noerr-Pennington protection be
applicable to negotiations with private decisionmakers? The rationale would
be that some insurers, such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield, enjoy some stateconferred advantages. Are there grounds for reexamining Noerr-Pennington
protection in cases involving concerted actions by groups of providers against
a state agency, such as Medicaid?
Relationships between physicians, hospitals, and insurers have sometimes
had the appearance of being too friendly rather than unfriendly. The best
example is traditional hospital and physician involvement in the governance
of Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans. What are the manifestations and
consequences of such friendly relationships and what is the track record of
antitrust enforcement agencies in dealing with them?
State of Competition in Health Insurance Markets.
The market for private
insurance in the United States includes insurers with a diversity of ownership
forms. The nonprofit insurers derive certain state-conferred advantages, such
as favorable tax treatment and in a few states inclusion in hospital rate-setting
programs from which commercial insurer competitors are excluded. There

are several issues to be addressed.
1. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 355 U.S. 127 (1961).
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Which government policies may confer special advantages for certain
types of insurers? How important is this source of competitive advantage?
How have relationships between providers and insurers affected insurer
market shares, such as the practice of hospitals granting discounts to certain
insurers? What should be the posture of antitrust enforcement agencies to
territorial restrictions preventing individual Blue plans from competing with
one another in a particular geographic market? How should such agencies
view combinations of insurance plans with providers, as occurs when a Blue
plan sponsors a health maintenance organization? Has the antitrust
exemption of insurers, McCarran-Ferguson, 2 outlived its usefulness? Does
McCarran-Ferguson properly apply when insurers become providers?
Quality-of-Care Issues.
Professional associations may undertake a number
of actions under the guise of quality protection. For example, a medical
society may take action against an individual physician on grounds of
"unethical" conduct and/or on grounds of low-quality care. Professional
associations have passed judgment on the qualifications of other types of
practitioners, such as chiropractors and nurse-midwives, to perform certain
types of care. Such associations may attempt to restrict the practice of these
other practitioners in various ways, such as admonishing their members not to
deal with the other practitioners and by preventing the other group from
gaining access to their hospitals.
Under what circumstances is the public interest served when professional
associations withhold information from the public? Examples include the
identities of physicians who have been subject to a disciplinary action and
information on adverse outcomes in hospitals, including hospital-specific
mortality rates and rates of hospital-acquired infections.
When can bans on advertising promoted by professional associations be
justified on quality-of-care grounds? Should provider boycotts justified for
quality reasons be tolerated? Physicians with a certain practice style might be
boycotted. A boycott may follow a reduction in Medicaid reimbursement.
Under what circumstances are associations' codes of ethics truly qualityenchancing?
When, if ever, should courts consider quality-of-care defenses in rule of
reason analysis? If so, what are valid defenses?
Technology Assessment.
Given the rapid pace of technological change
combined with growing cost containment pressure on private and public
payers, there will undoubtedly be increased demand for technology
assessments to determine specifically which technologies are "cost effective"
as well as "safe." Professional associations and other organizations (for
example, associations of equipment manufacturers) may want to conduct their
own evaluations. Such organizations may fear that, with government's role as
a payer, government assessments may be biased against finding the new
2.

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1015.
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technologies to be effective. Or rather than seeking "truth," the motivation
driving some private assessments may be anticompetitive in nature.
Private technology assessments could potentially be anticompetitive if
such efforts were biased toward findings that placed certain groups of
providers at a competitive advantage. Several pertinent questions arise. How
should such private research be structured? How long should the
organization be granted a monopoly for the conduct of such research, if in
fact a monopoly is to be granted? How should the results be disseminated?
Should the organization be required to supply pertinent material to permit
replication by other groups. If the organization finds that a particular
procedure, item of equipment, or technique is ineffective, what types of
actions by the organization to prevent performance of the technology should
be allowed?
Almost three years have elapsed between the date of the planning meeting
and the publication date of this symposium issue. Although the issue bears a
1988 publication date, the material covered in the papers extends through
early 1989.
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